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PROSPECTS FOR NATIONAL MINORITIES
UNDER THE DAYTON ACCORDS-Lessons
From History: The Inter-War Minorities
Schemes and the "Yugoslav Nations"'
Julie Mertus*
Nothing... is more likely to disturb the peace of the world
than the treatment which might in certain circumstances be
meted out to minorities.'
I. INTRODUCTION
After World War I, the victorious allies used international
law to rearrange the European landscape, parceling out the
losses of Germany, the Ottoman Empire, Bulgaria and the
successor states of the Habsburg Empire, Austria and Hunga-
ry. As one author described, "[t]he principle of 'one nation, one
state' was not realized to the full extent permitted by the
ethnographic configuration of Europe, but it was approximated
more closely than ever before."2 Protections for minority
groups within the newly created nation-states-religious, cul-
tural, language and national minorities-were designed as a
counter-balance to national self-determination since millions of
people were left out of "their" nation-state. To some degree, it
was advantageous to protect the rights of nations that had
t Copyright © 1998 Julie Mertus.
* Julie Mertus is a visiting professor at Emory Law School. This article was
written when she was a fellow in the Human Rights Program at Harvard Law
School and an affiliate with the Harvard Center for International Affairs (suit-
case@igc.apc.org). Research for this Article was made possible with the support of
the Stable Foundation and the Human Rights Program at Harvard Law School.
The author wishes to thank Henry Steiner, Barnett Rubin, Nathaniel Berman,
Marcus Schmidt and Paul Hunt for their comments on earlier versions of this
work and, in addition, Michael Asaro for his attention to editing this piece. An
earlier version of this work is published in MINORITY RIGHTS IN THE "NEW EU-
ROPE" (Steven Wheatley & Peter Cumper eds., forthcoming Spring 1998).
1. President Woodrow Wilson, Speech at the Plenary Session of the Paris
Peace Conference (May 31, 1919), reprinted in 5 A HISTORY OF THE PEACE CON-
FERENCE OF PARIS 130 (H.W.V. Temperley ed., Oxford University Press 1969)
(1924).
2. INIS L. CLAUDE, JR., NATIONAL MINORITIES: AN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM
12 (Greenwood Press 1969) (1955).
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been trampled by empires. Barbara Jelavich explains:
The victors had two roads to peace. First, they could base the
terms of the treaties on the idealistic principles enunciated
during the war by the Socialist parties, the Bolshevik govern-
ment and Woodrow Wilson in his Fourteen Points. The aim
would be a just peace based on self-determination and concil-
iation between the victor and the vanquished .... The sec-
ond alternative ... would be to apply the secret treaties and
impose a punitive peace on the defeated governments. After
all, no state in either camp had shown much interest in self-
determination in the formulation of its own wartime objec-
tives, unless ... the principle would advance its own claims.3
Under the interwar agreements then, "the victor states took
the spoils-but with the stipulations often clothed in the ideal-
istic language of national self-determination and justice.'
The negotiators for peace in the Balkans5 made a similar
compromise: the territorial victors were rewarded and, at the
same time, the peace process trumpeted self-determination and
justice. In the Dayton peace system, human rights provisions
constitute a corollary and corrective to a new twist on the
principle of self-determination. The Dayton Accords6 simulta-
3. 2 BARBARA JELAVIcH, THE HISTORY OF THE BALKANS 122 (1983).
4. Id.
5. The process of negotiations was extended and cumulative, in the sense
that each new proposal built in some way on a previous proposal. This Article
discusses only the agreement known as the "Dayton Accord." See infra note 6. An
analysis of the proposals leading up to this agreement, with a particular emphasis
on human rights provisions, appears in Paul C. Szasz, Protecting Human and
Minority Rights in Bosnia: A Documentary Survey of International Proposals, 25
CAL. W. INTL L.J. 237 (1995). An analysis of the constitutional proposals leading
up to the Constitution adopted by Dayton can be found in Paul C. Szasz, The
Quest for a Bosnian Constitution: Legal Aspects of Constitutional Proposals Relat-
ing to Bosnia, 19 FORDHAM1 INTL L.J. 363 (1995).
6. The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Dec. 14, 1995, Bosn. & Herz.-Croat.-Yugo., 35 I.L.M. 89 [hereinafter Dayton Ac-
cords], is also reproduced in U.N. Doc. A/501790-S/1995/999 in the form initialed in
Dayton on November 21, 1995. The version that appears in International Legal
Materials or I.L.M. is the agreement as it was signed on December 14, 1995, in
Paris. The latter version corrects minor errors that are present in the United
Nations (UN) printing. All references herein to "Dayton" or the "Dayton Accords"
are to the latter. The Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
contained in the Dayton Accords, supra, Annex 4, 35 I.L.M. 114, is referenced
herein as BOSN. & HERZ. CONST. Although I have chosen to use the shorthand of
"Dayton," I realize that a more proper name for the agreement would be the "Day-
ton/Paris Agreement." Cf Paul C. Szasz, The Protection of Human Rights Through
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neously advance alternative visions of self-determination.
Through formal affirmation of the legal integrity of the inter-
nationally-recognized state of Bosnia,7 Dayton claims to re-
spect the Bosnians' earlier act of self-determination. Yet Day-
ton also. takes steps to eviscerate the earlier moment of self-
determination. Dayton divides the state of Bosnia and
Herzegovina roughly in two, giving Serbs what they wanted all
along, a semi-autonomous state,8 and paving the way for what
Croats wanted all along, the securing of their borders and
political and military inroads into Herzegovina.?
In crafting its guarantees, the drafters of Dayton faced far
different circumstances than interwar diplomats, circumstanc-
es marked by increased global interdependence, accelerated
regionalization and marked development in international legal
systems and mechanisms. Europe had already been divided
into nation-states; economic insecurity and power struggles
within these nation-states had created new instabilities and
tapped nascent nationalisms; war raged in Bosnia and
the Dayton/Paris Peace Agreement on Bosnia, 90 AM. J. INTL L. 301, 301 (1996).
Agreements subsequent to the Dayton Accords can be found on the web page for
the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina at the following
internet address: <http-//www.ohr.int:81/index.html>.
The parties to the Dayton Accords were the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina (represented by its President, Alija Izetbegovic), the Republic of
Croatia (represented by its President, Franjo Tudjman) and the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia (represented by the President of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic). See
Dayton Accords, supra, signatures, 35 I.L.M. 91. By a special agreement of August
29, 1995, Milosevic was granted power to negotiate for Republika Srpska.
Milosevic's delegation included three officials of Republika Srpska, Momcilo
Krajisnik, Nikola Koljevic and Aleska Buha. Although these leaders, all members
of the Republika Srpska Parliament, refused to participate in the initialing of the
agreement at Dayton, they initialed the texts in Pale on November 24, 1995, and
they participated in the signature ceremony later in Paris. See Szasz, supra, at
304 n.13.
7. In particular, see BOSN. & HERZ. CONST. art. I: "The Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina . . . shall continue its legal existence under international law as
a state, with its internal structure modified as provided herein," divided into two
"Entities"-the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika
Srpska-and with its present internationally recognized borders. Id. art. I(1),(3).
8. If put to a vote, there is little question that at this time Bosnian Serbs
would vote for either an autonomous state or a semi-autonomous state aligned
closely with Serbia. The Dayton accord advances both of these agendas.
9. Bosnian Croats, unlike Bosnian Serbs, do not have sole control over their
own semi-autonomous state as they must share it with Bosnian Muslims. Howev-
er, recent history has shown that this arrangement has indeed fulfilled the greater
Croatian goals of making inroads into Bosnia-Herzogovina.
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Herzegovina and Croatia. Post-war thinking had shifted away
from the group-based minority rights of the interwar period to
an individual-based human rights model." In contrast to the
drafters of the interwar plans, the authors of the Dayton Ac-
cords had a host of post-World War II regional and interna-
tional agreements at their disposal, such as the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms" (European Convention) and the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 2
Nevertheless, this Article argues, the grand scheme to
protect national minorities" embodied in the Dayton Accords
10. Although support for group-based minority rights can still be seen today
in several systems and mechanisms; for example, in the European system, the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) catalogue of rights.
See, e.g., PATRICK THORNBERRY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE RIGHTS OF MINORI-
TIES (1991); Gudmundur Alfredsson, Minority Rights and a New World Order, in
BROADENING THE FRONTIERS OF HUMAN RIGHTS: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ASBJoRN
EIDE 55-78 (Donna Gomien ed., 1993); Gudmundur Alfredsson & Danilo Tfrk,
International Mechanisms for the Monitoring and the Protection of Minority Rights:
Their Advantages, Disadvantages and Interrelationships, in 30 MONITORING HUMAN
RIGHTS IN EUROPE 169, 169-186 (Arie Bloed et al. eds., 1993); Giorgio Sacerdoti,
New Developments in Group Consciousness and the International Protection of the
Rights of Minorities, 13 ISR. Y.B. ON HUM. RTS. 116 (1983); Felix Ermacora, The
Protection of Minorities Before the United Nations, 182 RECUEIL DES COURS 247
(1983).
11. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
12. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 360 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
13. The term "national minorities" is used in the manner invoked by the peo-
ple of the former Yugoslavia: nations are groups brought together by such factors
as common language, culture, traditions and mythologies. "National minorities" are
those people who do not belong to the majority nation in their country. Note that
the term "nation" as used herein does not mean "state"--rather, nation is more
akin to the American use of the term "ethnic group." At times, I also use the
term "ethno-national minorities" to underscore the similarities with the American-
ized term "ethnic" and to highlight the difference between nations and states.
In 1987, the UN issued a compilation of definition proposals submitted to it
over a forty year period. See Compilation of Proposals Concerning the Definition of
the term "Minority", U.N. ESCOR, Comm. on Hum. Rts., 43rd Sess., U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1987/WG.5/WP.1 (1986). The literature on nations and nationalisms is
bountiful. For definitions of "nations", see generally Definition and Classification of
Minorities, U.N. ESCOR, Comm. on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities, 2nd Sess., U.N. Doc. ECN.4/sub.2/85 (1949); PETER ALTER, NATIONAL-
ISM (2d ed. 1994); BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON
THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM (1983); JOHN BREUILLY, NATIONALISM
AND THE STATE (1982); ERNEST GELLNER, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM (1983);
MONTSERRAT GUIBERNAU, NATIONALISMS: THE NATION-STATE AND NATIONALISM IN
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1996); ERIC HOBSBAWM, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM
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bears marked similarities with the minority rights guarantees
created after the first World War. The Minorities Treaties, 4
concluded under the auspices of the League of Nations and
other interwar minority rights measures, 5 failed to protect
the rights of ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities and to
create a long-lasting peace. Dayton appears to be headed in the
same direction. While tracking closely the international peace
techniques of days gone by, Dayton jettisons the language and
constructs through which the people of the land once called
Yugoslavia had become accustomed to defining them-
selves-that is, as nations (narod)6 or national minorities
(narodnosti). At the same time, on top of all of its heavy hu-
man rights machinery, Dayton creates a nation-based govern-
ment designed to cement national divides. What vision of soci-
SINCE 1780 (1990); DAVID MILLER, ON NATIONALITY (1995); ANTHONY D. SMITH,
NATIONS AND NATIONALISM IN A GLOBAL ERA (1995); John A. Hall, Nationalisms,
Classified and Explained, in NOTIONS OF NATIONALISM 8, 8-33 (Sukumar Periwal
ed., 1995); Lea Brilmayer, The Moral Significance of Nationalism, 71 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 7, 9-12 (1995); Thomas M. Franck, Clan and Superclan: Loyalty, Identity
and Community in Law and Practice, 90 AM. J. INTL L. 359, 360-68 (1996). For
works on ethnicity, see PAUL R. BRASS, ETHNICITY AND NATIONALISM (1991); ETH-
NICITY (John Hutchinson & Anthony D. Smith eds., 1996); ETHNICITY: THEORY AND
EXPERIENCE (Nathan Glazer & Daniel P. Moynihan eds., 1975).
14. As explained further below, a number of treaties were concluded by which
the protection of national minorities was internationalized. "Minorities Treaties"
were included in the Peace Treaties of St. Germain, Triano, Neuilly and Lausanne
and the Albanian and Lithuanian Declarations. The Minorities Treaties empowered
the League of Nations to receive petitions, conduct fact-finding investigations and
issue directives to those nations in violation of the treaties. Only one of three
cases brought before the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) was
decided, although the court gave five advisory opinions on minority questions be-
tween 1923 and 1931. For an explanation of the operation of the treaties, see P.
DE AZCARATE, THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND NATIONAL MINORITIES 92-136 (Eileen
E. Brooke trans., 1945); see also generally Francesco Capotorti, Study on the
Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious, and Linguistic Minorities, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.21384/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. E.78XIV.1 (1979). For PCIJ opinions,
see, e.g., Advisory Opinion, Minority Schools in Albania, 1935 P.C,I.J. (ser. A/B)
No. 62 (Apr. 6); Advisory Opinion, Treatment of Polish Nationals, 1932 P.C.I.J.
(ser. A/B) No. 44 (Feb. 4); Advisory Opinion No. 17, Interpretation of the Conven-
tion Between Greece and Bulgaria Respecting Reciprocal Emigration, 1930 P.C.I.J.
(ser. B) No. 17 (July 31).
15. In particular, the Convention Between Germany and Poland Relating to
Upper Silesia, May 15, 1922, Pol.-Ger. 9 L.N.T.S. 466 [hereinafter Convention
Relating to Upper Silesia] (known as the "Geneva Convention" at the time), con-
tained minority rights protections and even permitted individuals to bring cases
against their own state. See GEORGES KAECKENBEECK, THE INTERNATIONAL EXPERI-
MENT OF UPPER SILESIA 47-55 (1942).
16. The Slavic word "narod" means both "nation" and "people."
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ety is imposed by Dayton? Is this vision compatible with prior
social and legal constructions? Will Dayton be any more suc-
cessful than the interwar plans at fostering rights and securing
peace?
In order to answer these questions one must look both
backward and forward. Examination of the historical underpin-
nings of Dayton has been missing from policy discussions on
protection for national minorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Croatia and other troubled parts of Central and Eastern Eu-
rope. Yet Dayton did not appear from nowhere. It was influ-
enced by earlier international and regional attempts to respond
to crumbling states, races for power and demands for self-de-
termination. Understanding the stumbling blocks to Dayton's
effective enforcement requires an inquiry into earlier interna-
tional frameworks designed for constructing peace and pat-
terns of (mis)use of power in response to such frameworks.
Additionally, Dayton's attempt to address the question of "na-
tional minorities" runs headlong into previous Yugoslav and
trans-Yugoslav"7 efforts to manage and construct nationalist
identities. Thus, an assessment of Dayton also necessitates an
analysis of the ways in which Dayton projects identity con-
structs onto an already laden identity field: a field in which
deep-rooted cultural and legal identity tags have already been
reapportioned and redeployed by the protagonists of the wars
in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina."5
This Article opens"9 an exploration of the Dayton Accords
through two historical inquiries. First, it analyzes the ways in
which Dayton responds to the question of national identity, as
framed by earlier notions of group identity. Second, it exam-
ines Dayton in light of the minorities rights agreements of the
interwar years, beginning with a brief outline of the interwar
system20 and proceeding with comparisons of the similarities
17. By "trans-Yugoslav" I mean everything outside of Yugoslavia-that is,
international and regional-which could, of course, include Yugoslavia as well.
18. For this point, I am indebted to the work of Nathaniel Berman. See
Nathaniel Berman, The International Law of Nationalism: Group Identity and
Legal History, in DAVID WIPPMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ETHNIC CONFLICT
(forthcoming Feb. 1998).
19. I use this terminology as this is only a modest beginning of what must be
a much larger project.
20. For a more extended analysis of the minorities provisions of the interwar
years, see Nathaniel Berman, "But the Alternative is Despair": European Nation-
alism and the Modernist Renewal of International Law, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1792
798 [Vol. XXII:3
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and differences with Dayton. My thesis is two-fold. On the one
hand, the similarities between Dayton and the treaties of the
interwar period could spell disaster for minorities of the Bal-
kans and perhaps elsewhere as well, if the international com-
munity continues to repeat its same mistakes. On the other
hand, the differences between Dayton and the interwar agree-
ments could provide salvation.
II. NATIONAL IDENTITY: CONSTRUCTS BEFORE AND AFTER
DAYTON
Over time, the matter of national identity became increas-
ingly important in the former Yugoslavia due to the regime's
attempts to enforce Yugoslav national identity over all other
senses of belonging. Although national identity was not the
cause of the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, it
provided the soil in which the elites' struggle for power could
take root. In turn, this soil was fertilized by a combination of
ingredients: the actions and inactions of international financial
institutions which led Yugoslavia to the brink of disaster,"'
tremendous fear and uncertainty among the general populace,
heavy state and party control over the broadcast media, a
"heritage of authoritarianism,"22 and a lack of civil society.
Many have recognized the role of nationalism in fanning the
flames of war in the Balkans. Few have analyzed how Dayton
responds to national identity constructs hardened by years of
war. Yet to be viewed as legitimate by the people of the region,
Dayton must at least address the past ways of naming. More-
over, to promote long term peace, Dayton must somehow take
steps to break down the virulent national divides.23 As this
(1993).
21. Susan Woodward is one of the few commentators who speaks of the role
of international monetary institutions in the collapse of Yugoslavia. See SUSAN L.
WOODWARD, BALKAN TRAGEDY: CHAOs AND DISSOLUTION AFTER THE COLD WAR 47-
81 (1995).
22. Du~an Janjid, Resurgence of Ethnic Conflict in Yugoslavia: the Demise of
Communism and the Rise of the "New Elites" of Nationalism, in YUGOSLAVIA: THE
FORMER AND FUTURE 29, S3 (Payam Akhavan & Robert Howse eds., 1995).
23. This does not mean that Dayton can or should abandon national divides
altogether. On the contrary, these divisions exist and will exist for the unforesee-
able future. The challenge is to turn virulent, combative nationalism into what
Yael Tamir would call "liberal nationalism," that is, a state in which each nation
has an actual voice. See generally YAEL TAimI, LIBERAL NATIONALISM (1993).
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section illustrates, Dayton accomplishes neither of these tasks.
This section makes a modest contribution24 to the explo-
ration of the development of national identity by sketching the
trend in the former Yugoslavia over three periods: (a) the for-
mal naming of groups in the constitutional developments be-
tween .1946 and 1974; (b) the impact of the collapse of Yugo-
slavia; and (c) the impact of war (1992-1995). Against this
backdrop, it outlines Dayton's response: ignoring old ways of
naming and cementing its own brand of national identity.
A. Development of National Identity in Yugoslavia
1. Constitutional Development
Yugoslavia had three constitutions after World War II and
before its collapse:' 1946, 1963 and 1974. By arranging the
legal and social terms with which people were to operate, each
of these constitutions had an impact on shaping national iden-
tity.2" Officially, everyone was Yugoslav, united for "brother-
hood and unity (bratsvoi jedinstuo)."27 But by the time of the
1946 Constitution," Yugoslavia was divided into two catego-
ries-in Zoran Pajid's terms; the hosts and the "'historical
24. The contribution is particularly modest in that many other factors can be
examined to determine, explore and explain national identity. Based on the as-
sumption that laws influence identity, this section focuses on the formal legal
naming of groups. However, this is just the corner of the inquiry.
25. The exact date of the collapse is open to dispute. Some would set the
beginning of the collapse before the death of former Yugoslavian leader Josip Broz
(known to his supporters as Tito) in May 1980; others would point to the erup-
tions in Kosovo in March 1989, after the Serbian Parliament stripped Kosovo and
Vojvodina of their autonomous status; others point to January 1991 when the
Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia adopted the Charter announcing that it
would initiate the procedure of disassociation from Yugoslavia; and still other
dates can be found. Many books exist on the collapse of Yugoslavia. One of the
best is LAURA SILBER & ALLAN Lr=1LE, THE DEATH OF YUGOSLAVIA (1995). See
also generally LENARD J. COHEN, BROKEN BONDS: THE DISINTEGRATION OF YUGO-
SLAVIA (1993); BRANKA MAGA , THE DESTRUCTION OF YUGOSLAVIA (1993); MARK
THOMPSON, A PAPER HOUSE: THE ENDING OF YUGOSLAVIA (1992); WOODWARD,
supra note 21; YUGOSLAVIA: THE FORMER AND FUTURE, supra note 22. For an
overview of ethnic politics in all parts of the former Yugoslavia, see JANUSZ
BUGAJSKI, ETHNIC POLITICS IN EASTERN EUROPE (1995).
26. This does not of course settle the question of which came first, the iden-
tity or the Constitution.
27. "Brotherhood and unity" was the slogan of the Tito era. See, e.g., Ivan
Vejvoda, Yugoslavia 1945-91-From Decentralisation Without Democracy to Dissolu-
tion, in D.A. DYKER & I. VEJVODA, YUGOSLAVIA AND AFTER 10, 11 (1996).
28. YUGO. CONST. of 1946.
800
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guests.'"29 The hosts, or nations (narod), were: Serbs, Croats,
Slovenes, Macedonians and Montenegrins. The guests were
called national minorities. Under the 1946 Constitution, sover-
eignty rested with the people.
With the 1963 Constitution, national minorities were re-
designated as nationalities (narodnosti),3° apparently because
the word "minority" was perceived to be too demeaning. Na-
tionality includes all those with a national homeland else-
where, such as Albanians, Hungarians, Italians, Bulgarians,
Turks, Slovaks, Czechs and Russians. Those without a home-
land elsewhere, such as the Romanians and Vlachs, were
seemingly left outside the 1963 Constitution, but some were
outside of nationalities-those without a country elsewhere.
After the 1963 Constitution, Muslims were elevated in status
from a nationality to a nation.3'
The 1974 Constitution was a turning point in which na-
tional differences became "constitutionally enshrined." 2 Arti-
cle 1 of the 1974 Constitution defines Yugoslavia as "a federal
state having the form of a state community of voluntarily unit-
ed nations and their Socialist Republics."3 The possessive
construction of this provision is important: the republics be-
longed to the nations. Many people lived outside of their na-
tional homeland, however, frequently in their own national
community, and thus the fit between homeland and nation
could not be complete. Unlike earlier constitutions, under the
1974 Constitution, sovereignty did not rest simply with the
people. Instead, sovereignty rested in the "sovereign rights"
that the "nations and nationalities shall exercise ... in the
Socialist Republics, and in the Socialist Autonomous Provinc-
es... [and] in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
29. Zoran Paji6, Bosnia-Herzegovina: From Multiethnic Coexistence to "Apart-
heid".., and Back, in YUGOSLAVIA: THE FORMER AND FUTURE, supra note 22, at
152, 162.
30. See GISBERT H. FLANz, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD:
YUGOSLAVIA 10 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1971); see also YUGO.
CONST. of 1963, reprinted in FLANZ, supra, at 1.
31. See FRITS W. HONDIus, THE YUGOSLAV COMMUNITY OF NATIONS 247-48
(1968).
32. This term is used in Katherine Verdery, Nationalism and National Senti-
ment in Post-Socialist Romania, 52 SLAVIC REV. 179, 184 (1993); and Mary Kaldor,
Cosmopolitanism Versus Nationalism: The New Divide?, in EUROPE'S NEW NATION-
ALISM 42, 49 (Richard Caplan & John Feffer eds., 1996).
33. YUGO. CONST. of 1974 art. 1.
BROOK. J. INT'L L.
when in their common interests"34
In a manner that lent more importance to national identi-
ty, power under the 1974 Constitution was further decentral-
ized from the federal to the republic level. Each of Yugoslavia's
six republics and two provinces had a central bank, separate
police, and educational and judicial systems. So did Serbia's
two provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina. Important economic and
political perks were divided on the sub-federal level; that is, to
the six republics and two provinces. These units, with the
exception of Bosnia and Herzegovina, were de facto5 orga-
nized largely around national identity, based on the majority
nation of that region. Thus, rewards were in fact based on
national status. Through such arrangements, "ethnicity [na-
tional status], which had seemingly been buried by the 1971
intervention [Tito's squelching of nationalist movements in
Croatia], returned by the back door.""
The "nationality key" system was another institutional
arrangement which effectively promoted nationalist inter-
ests.37 A proportional representation scheme, the "key" be-
came a means for many incompetent and/or corrupt party
members to achieve positions of importance simply because
they were of the right national status. Obliged to support those
who promoted them, these politico-bureaucrats were often
subject to manipulation at the hands 6f their leaders. Within
each republic or province, popular backlash began against the
incompetents of the minority nation who had been promoted to
high positions of power, thus indirectly widening national
divides.
34. Id. preamble. To confuse matters more, Article 244 provided that "nations,
nationalities, working people, and citizens shall realize and ensure sovereignty." Id.
art. 244. For an analysis of this provision, see Vojin Dimitrijevi6, The 1974 Consti-
tution and Constitutional Process as a Factor in the Collapse of Yugoslavia, in
YUGOSLAVIA: THE FORMER AND FUTURE, supra note 22, at 45, 55-56.
35. Formally, the "national key" system demanded a system of proportional
representation. See SILVO DEvETAK, THE EQUALITY OF NATIONS AND NATIONALITIES
IN YUGOSLAVIA 8 (1988); Dimitrijevi6, supra note 34, at 59, 61.
36. George Sch6pflin, The Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, in THE POLITIcS OF
ETHNIC CONFLicT REGULATION 172, 190 (John McGarry & Brendan O'Leary eds.,
1993).
37. The use of the terminology "national key" is quite common in Yugoslav
literature. For one recent English usage, see Una Sekerez, Nation and State
Building in Bosnia and Herzegovina (visited Jan. 9, 1998)
<http://www.cep.yale.edu/projects/studcon/papers/95/sekerez.html>; see also JELAVICH,
supra note 3, at 400.
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Other key attributes of the Yugoslav constitutional system
pertaining to national minorities included seemingly vast poly-
ethnic rights,38 such as the right to use one's own language in
public and to primary education in one's own language. This
was counter-balanced by constitutional prohibitions against
propagating or practicing national inequality and incitement of
national, racial or religious hatred and intolerance.
Even after the 1974 Constitution, Yugoslavia operated
politically as a unitary state governed by a centralized Com-
munist party. As Vojin Dimitrijevic has observed, "[plarty
members were submitted to the strict discipline of 'democratic
centralism' and were removable by the decision of the superior
party organs, which were obeyed even if they violated the
[1974] Constitution and its laws."39 The greatest flaw of the
1974 Constitution was that it set up a "census" system which
officially "prevented any decisions from being adopted if op-
posed by any single federal unit (including the autonomous
provinces.)"40 This further weakened the federation "by para-
lyzing the decision-making process and removing real authori-
ty of federal decisions,"' placing it back in the hands of the
party. With everything in the control of the party, individuals
had little incentive to become involved in politics and thus, the
idea of a civil society was nearly nonexistent.
2. Collapse: Sorting Out Process
42
The collapse of Yugoslavia evidenced an even greater sort-
ing out process according to national identity. Sovereignty,
equated quickly with the right to have an independent state,
was used as a rhetorical device along national lines, with each
side claiming to have its own. Similarly, national status was
used as a rhetorical device, with each side, beginning with the
Serbs, pitting themselves against the evil "Other."'
38. I take this characterization from WiLL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZEN-
SHIP 30-33 (1995).
39. Dimitrijevi6, supra note 34, at 72-73.
40. Id. at 60.
41. Id. at 71.
42. This section is condensed in the interest of space. An examination of the
process of collapse can be found in JULIE MERTUS, NATIONAL TRUTHS: REMEMBER-
ING KOSOVO (forthcoming 1998).
43. This process began first in Kosovo. See generally Julie Mertus, Remember
Kosovo?, 8 UNCAPTIVE MINDS 65 (1995-96). The group known as "Others," which
803
BROOK. J. INTL L.
In the first real elections, nationalism became the mecha-
nism for political differentiation.' Few alternative categories
existed to distinguish the candidates; the previous authoritari-
an regime had not encouraged the development of civil society
in which more sophisticated differences could have emerged.
Political and economic structures swayed under the weight of
internal bickering as new leaders struggled for power and
international financial institutions pressed Yugoslavia to pay
its long overdue bills.45 This situation fostered intense nation-
alist bureaucratic competition, and often corruption, often
along national lines.46 Certainly, nationalism was not the only
force pushing Yugoslavia toward collapse, but it was a crucial
ingredient.
3. The Impact of War: Closing of the Ranks
War led to the closing of the ranks through a series of
interrelated steps. First, it accomplished the complete
demonization of the Other. In the beginning, it was the in-
tense, state-controlled propaganda machines that broadcast
stories of the Other's inhumanity. Over time, many witnesses
and victims of acts of great cruelty began to tell their sto-
ries-and their neighbors listened. The diaspora often played
an important role in this demonization process. Far away from
the region, living in nationally homogeneous marriages (at
least at a rate much higher than their kin back home), the
diaspora had an easier time painting the Other as evil.47
Second, war accomplished physical national segregation.
People who were forced to leave their villages and cities be-
cause of their national background crowded into new cities,
creating new enclaves of "their own people." 8 Segregation
included Italians, Jews, and some mixed families, were citizens of regions in the
former Yugoslavia that held no "ethnic allegiance." Fred L. Morrison, The Constitu.
tion of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 13 CONST. COMIIENT. 145, 146 (1996).
44. See Kaldor, supra note 32, at 50.
45. See WOODWARD, supra note 21, at 73-81.
46. See id. at 82-88.
47. Those who experienced wartime atrocities tend to be much less likely to
seek revenge against an entire group of people, although they may want to avenge
the death or torture of a particular family member. See generally THE SUITCASE:
REFUGEES VOICES FROM BOSNIA AND CROATIA (Julie Mertus et al. eds & Jelica
Todosijevic et al. trans., 1997).
48. For documentation of this process, see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WAR
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exploited and created Otherness.
Finally, war closed the ranks. People throughout the for-
mer Yugoslavia were forced to decide who they were among
three narrow choices: Serb, Croat or Muslim. This left four
categories of people without any iatentity: those of mixed par-
entage or marriage; those who were of another national identi-
ty, such as Albanian or Hungarian; those who wanted to iden-
tify themselves as something else, either above the nation,
such as European, or below the nation, such as a member of a
particular neighborhood or organization; and those who wanted
out of the labeling process altogether. Those who failed to
make a choice usually left the country (if they could) or fell
silent. A few stubbornly fought back,49 despite the extreme
backlash against anything different and potentially challenging
to the Nation."
B. Dayton's Response: Cementing the National Divide
The Dayton Accords almost completely jettison the famil-
iar terminology of the past-nation (narod) and nationalities
(narodnosti). The agreement does not even mention the words
"nations" and "nationalities," except in referring to internation-
al documents by name and in a section on the rights of refu-
gees to return.51 Instead, the Constitution of the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is contained in an annex to
Dayton, refers generally to three groups: Bosniacs,52 Croats
and Serbs as "constituent peoples (along with Others)."53
CRIMES IN BOSNIA-HERzEGOvINA 62-77 (Helsinki Watch Report, Aug. 1992).
49. Many of those who rejected the national labels were women's groups (al-
though of course not all women's groups were non-nationalistic). For an example of
a non-nationalist, anti-militarist women's group, see WOMEN FOR PEACE (Miranda
Collet et al. trans., 1996).
50. See Andjelka Mili6, Nationalism and Sexism: Eastern Europe in Transition,
in EUROPE'S NEW NATIONALISM, supra note 32, at 169, 170-71.
51. See Dayton Accords, supra note 6, Annex 7, 35 I.L.M. 136, 136-40 [herein-
after Refugees Annex].
52. According to some observers and participants in the peace process, the
term Bosniacs has become "a euphemism for Muslim." Paul Szasz, Remarks, A
Year After Dayton: Has the Bosnian Peace Process Worked?, Conference sponsored
by the Orville H. Schell, Jr. Center for International Human Rights, the Council
on Foreign Relations, and Yale United Nations Legal Studies (Nov. 15-16, 1996).
However, Bosniac could also mean all who do not identify with the earlier two
categories.
53. BOSN. & HER. CONST. preamble.
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Those who do not fall into this "group of three" see their status
reduced from nation (narod) or national minority (narodnosti)
to Other.54 The new framework of naming demeans those who
could not or will not choose among the three groups. By omit-
ting the words perceived as troublesome, Dayton does not
make the trouble go away. Instead, it lays a new foundation
for conflict.
Dayton actually further cements the national divide by
creating a system of nation-based governance. Under Dayton,
two smaller sub-Entities are drawn according to battlelines,
which in turn reflect national identity: Republika Srpska
(Bosnian Serb) and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
(Croat and Muslim/Bosniac).55 These two Entities are held
together by a "thin roof'5 -- a central government with so lit-
tle power that it "makes the American Articles of Confedera-
tion of two centuries ago look like a centralized, unitary form
of government."57 The central government, the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina," is responsible for: foreign policy;
foreign trade; customs; monetary policies; immigration, refugee
and asylum policy and regulation; international and inter-Enti-
ty criminal law enforcement; establishment of international
communication facilities; regulation of inter-Entity transporta-
tion; air traffic control; enacting legislation to carry out the
decisions of the Presidency or responsibilities of the federal
Assembly; and funding and budgeting for federal institu-
54. The Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (the smaller
Entity) makes clear that there are only two constituent nations-Bosniacs (Mus-
lims) and Croats-thereby devaluing the status of Serbs to invisibility. See Pro-
posed Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mar. 18, 1994,
preamble, art. 1(1), 33 I.L.M. 743, 743-44; Preliminary Agreement Concerning the
Establishment of a Confederation Between the Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia, Mar. 18, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 611.
55. See BOSN. & HERZ. CONST. art. 1(3).
56. This term has been used by Muhamed Sacirbey and others involved in the
Dayton negotiations. Muhamed Sacirbey, Remarks, A Year After Dayton: Has the
Bosnian Peace Process Worked?, Conference sponsored by the Orville H. Schell, Jr.
Center for International Human Rights, the Council on Foreign Relations, and
Yale United Nations Legal Studies (Nov. 15-16, 1996). However, Bosniac could also
mean all who do not identify with the earlier two categories.
57. Morrison, supra note 43, at 145.
58. Note the confusion in terminology: the larger body is the republic, but so
is one of the smaller parts-Republika Srpska-while the other smaller part is
called a federation-The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
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tions."9 The balance of powers, including promulgation and
enforcement of local civil and criminal laws and control over
courts (except for the joint Constitutional Court, the only feder-
al court), is given to the Entities."
The entire federal government is divided into threes based
on the same limited choice of national identity-Serb, Croat or
Muslim (Bosniac).6 ' The executive arm of the government has
three presidents, one from each group.62 Even the armed forc-
es are decentralized into threes. The Constitution states that
"[e] ach member of the Presidency shall, by virtue of the office,
have civilian command authority over armed forces."" Given
that each national group has at least one army, this provision
effectively creates three armies divided along national lines.'
The bi-cameral legislature is similarly proportioned equally
into the three national categories. The upper house (House of
Peoples) has five representatives from each group and the
lower house (House of Representatives) has fourteen of each
group-Serb, Croat and Muslim (Bosniac).65
Dayton perpetuates the rule of consensus that previously
worked so well to block any chance of democratic decision-
making and to promote national splintering.66 Fred Morrison
explains:
With respect to most civilian matters, the Presidency
acts by consensus ....
In the legislative branch... there are similar checks
and few balances .... In the upper house, the House of Peo-
ples, a majority of each ethnic group must be present in order
for there to be a quorum, so a dissenting ethnic group could
forestall action if three of its five members fail to attend ses-
sions. In both houses, the presiding officers are supposed to
encourage decisions to be taken with a majority of each eth-
nic group concurring. Failing such broad support, a simple
majority may take action, but if two-thirds of an ethnic group
opposes the legislation, it does not take effect.
59. See BOSN. & HERZ. CONST. arts. III(1), IV(4).
60. See id. arts. III(2)(c), (3)(a), VI.
61. See generally id. arts. IV, V.
62. See id. art. V.
63. Id. art. V(5)(a).
64. See Morrison, supra note 43, at 149.
65. See BOSN. & HERZ. CONST. art. IV(I)-(2), (3)(b).
66. See id. arts. IV(3)(d)-(e), V(2)(c).
807
BROOK. J. INT'L L.
There is still another "ethnic veto." A majority of the five
members of the upper house from any one of the ethnic
groups may declare a proposed decision of the legislature to
be "destructive of a vital interest" of that ethnic group. Such
a declaration then requires the votes of the upper house to be
taken separately; a majority of each of the three ethnic "cau-
cuses" is necessary for passage. (If a majority of an ethnic
group has already identified a decision as "destructive," it
seems unlikely that a majority of that same group will vote
for the legislation.)"
The complex consensus provisions, Laura Silber and Allan
Little have explained, were adopted at Dayton not because
they will work, but because Serbian President Slobodan
Milosevic refused to sign the agreement without them.68
Milosevic knew well that if the government had been permit-
ted to operate through some form of majority vote, a coalition
of Muslims and Croats could have always outvoted the
Serbs.69 On the other hand, the present compromise grants
any national group the power to make the Dayton governments
unworkable.
"Kin-states"-that is, states composed primarily of the
same national group as another entity1°-are granted great
leeway under the plan. The Constitution for the Federation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina explicitly permits each Entity to "es-
tablish special parallel relationships with neighboring states
consistent with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
Bosnia and Herzegovina."71 Most federal constitutions forbid
their smaller units from entering into treaties or other agree-
ments with foreign governments. Among the foreseeable ar-
rangements, the aforementioned provision will likely permit
Republika Srpska to enter into agreements with Yugoslavia
(also predominately ethnic Serb).
On a more positive note, neutrals play a key role in the
new government, particularly with respect to decision-making
bodies considering questions of human rights and related is-
67. Morrison, supra note 43, at 149 (footnotes omitted) (quoting BOSN. &
HERZ. CONST. art. IV(3)(e)).
68. See SaBER & LrriLE, supra note 25, at 308-10.
69. See id. at 308.
70. See Berman, supra note 20, at 1827.
71. BOSN. & HERZ. CONST. art. III(2)(a).
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sues.72 The role of neutrals, unlike the exclusionary naming of
groups and the nation-based structure of government, tends to
be viewed as a legitimate, potentially workable step by the
people of the region. The Constitutional Court is made up of
nine members, two of each national group and three foreign
neutrals appointed by the European Court of Human Rights.73
The European Court of Human Rights also appoints three
outsiders to join the six local members (two of each group) of a
commission that will consider claims of refugees.74 The Orga-
nization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) ap-
points the Human Rights Ombudsman, an individual from
another geographic area who will investigata and make reports
on human rights (focusing on present violations, not those
during war).75 The Committee of Ministers of the Council of
Europe appoints eight outside members to complement the six
local members (again, two of each group) of the Human Rights
Chamber, a body that reviews complaints filed by individuals
or by the Ombudsman.76 Similarly, the United Nations Edu-
cational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) ap-
points two outside members to a five member Commission to
Preserve National Monuments.77
Also on a positive note, Dayton establishes an extensive
structure for human rights for minorities, the return of refu-
gees and the restitution of property.78 These guarantees are
72. See id. art. II(1)-(2); see generally Dayton Accords, supra note 6, Annex 6,
35 I.L.M. 130, 130-36 [hereinafter Human Rights Annex]. This reflects a growing
trend in which states authorize external intervention in their internal affairs. For
a discussion of the legality of these measures, see David Wippman, Treaty-Based
Intervention: Who Can Say No?, 62 U. Cai. L. REv. 607, 684-87 (1995).
73. See BOSN. & HERZ. CONST. art. VI(1). The Constitutional Court has appel-
late jurisdiction over cases involving constitutional issues and original jurisdiction
in cases arising between the Entities, the Entities and the Central government, or
among the organs of the central government. See id. art. VI(3)(a)-(b). Significantly,
in human rights cases, the court can hear legal questions referred from the courts
of either Entity. See id. art. VI(3)(c). However, referral is strictly in the discretion
of the local courts. See id.
74. See Refugees Annex, supra note 51, arts. VI, IX(I), 35 I.L.M. 138-39.
75. See Human Rights Annex, supra note 72, arts. IV-V, 35 I.L.M. 132.
76. See id. arts. V(7), VII(l)-(2), 35 I.L.M. 132-33.
77. Dayton Accords, supra note 6, Annex 8, art. II(1), 35 I.L.M. 144, 145
[hereinafter National Monument Annex].
78. These guarantees are found in three sections of the Dayton Accords: An-
nex 6 (The Agreement on Human Rights); Annex 7 (The Agreement on Refugees
and Displaced Persons); and the Preamble, Article II, and the Annex (listing inter-
national and regional human rights documents) to the Constitution of Bosnia and
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intended to counter-balance the nationalist divides created
elsewhere in the Dayton structure and to provide protection for
those who live outside "their appropriate" Entity-mainly Mus-
lims and Croats living in Republika Srpska. A massive return
of the expelled would only enhance the need for minority rights
guarantees.79 The Constitution declares that "Bosnia and
Herzegovina and both Entities shall ensure the highest level of
internationally recognized human rights and fundamental free-
doms." ° To accomplish this goal, on the one hand, Dayton
creates new mechanisms, such as the Human Rights Cham-
ber,8' Office of the Ombudsman82 and Refugee Commis-
sion' and, on the other hand, it builds in an array of existing
international and regional human rights systems and mecha-
nisms. Dayton both lists a series of rights' and incorporates
a list of international and regional instruments." Of all of
these instruments, the European Convention is supreme. The
Constitution specifies that the European Convention and its
protocols "shall apply directly in Bosnia and Herzegovina" and
"shall have priority over all other law."86
Dayton includes numerous protections for people of minori-
ty nations, albeit for the most part of an individualistic and
not collective nature. For example, the Constitution of Bosnia
and Herzegovina contains a nondiscrimination principle which
insures that rights are granted, on a nondiscriminatory basis,
to individual persons associated with a particular national
status, instead of to peoples, communities or nations.87 At the
Herzegovina. For a concise analysis of this structure, see Szasz, supra note 6, at
308-10.
79. According to Ambassador Robert Frowick, Head of the Mission in Bosnia
and Herzegovina for the OSCE, it is estimated that as of November 1996, at least
200,000 refugees and displaced people had returned. Robert Frowick, Remarks, A
Year After Dayton: Has the Bosnian Peace Process Worked?, Conference sponsored
by the Orville H. Schell, Jr. Center for International Human Rights, the Council
on Foreign Relations, and Yale United Nations Legal Studies (Nov. 15-16, 1996).
80. BOSN. & HERz. CONsT. art. II(1).
81. See Human Rights Annex, supra note 72, arts. VII-VIII, 35 I.L.M. 133.
82. See id. arts. IV-V, 35 I.L.M. 132.
83. See Refugees Annex, supra note 51, arts. VII-IX, 35 I.L.M. 138-39.
84. See BOSN. & HERZ. CONST. art. II(3)(a)-(m); Human Rights Annex, supra
note 72, art. I(1)-(13), 35 I.L.M. 130-31.
85. See Human Rights Annex, supra note 72, app. (Human Rights Agree-
ments), 35 I.L.M. 136.
86. BOSN. & HERz. CONST. art. 11(2).
87. See BOSN. & HERZ. CONST. art. II(4).
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same time, the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina grants
citizenship regardless of "association with a national minori-
ty"' and the Annexed Agreement on Refugees and Displaced
Persons calls for the prosecution of persons in the military,
paramilitary and police forces who are "responsible for serious
violations of the basic rights of persons belonging to ethnic or
minority groups." 9 In addition, many of the regional and in-
ternational guarantees referenced by the document safeguard
the rights of minorities." While nearly all of these guarantees
apply to individuals and not collectives, two of the regional
instruments provide particularly extensive guarantees for
national minorities: the 1992 European Charter for Regional
and Minority Languages9 and the 1994 Framework Conven-
tion for the Protection of National Minorities (Framework
Convention).92
Also significant for national minorities, the Dayton Ac-
cords contain extensive provisions requiring the encourage-
ment of and cooperation with international human rights orga-
nizations." Among these organizations are the United Na-
tions (UN) Commission on Human Rights, the UN High Com-
missioner on Human Rights, the OSCE and the supervisory
bodies of human rights treaties and the International War
Crimes tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. 94 Furthermore,
Dayton establishes an International Police Task Force to "pro-
vide a safe and secure environment for all persons in their
respective jurisdictions, by maintaining civilian law enforce-
ment agencies operating in accordance with internationally
88. Id. art. I(7)(b).
89. Refugees Annex, supra note 51, art. I(3)(e), 35 I.L.M. 137.
90. These agreements are listed in the BOSN. & HERZ. CONST. Annex 1, and
the Human Rights Annex, supra note 72, app. (Human Rights Agreements), 35
I.L.M. 136.
91. European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, Nov. 5, 1992,
Europ. T.S. No. 148.
92. Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Feb. 1,
1995, 34 I.L.M. 351 [hereinafter Framework Convention].
93. Human Rights Annex, supra note 72, art. XIII, 35 I.L.M. 135.
94. See 'id. art. XII(2). For the main agreements on the International War
Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, see G.A. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th
Sess., 3175th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (1993); G.A. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th
Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993); Report of the Secretary-General,
U.N. Doc. S/25704, revised by U.N. Doc. S/25704/Corr.1 (1993); The Rules of Proce-
dure and Evidence of the Tribunal Adopted on February 11, 1994, U.N. Doc. IT/32,
revised by U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.9 (1996).
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recognized standards and with respect for internationally rec-
ognized human rights and fundamental freedoms."95
To work, these human rights guarantees must somehow be
enforced. Without enforcement, the operation of the Dayton
Accords may well serve to legitimize nationalist interests un-
der the guise of protecting minorities and securing. peace. Will
the positive measures undertaken to promote human rights be
sufficient to counter-balance the seemingly inoperable system
of government created by Dayton and its demeaning of peoples
who do not or will not fit into the "group of threes?" As we will
see from the discussion below, the legal techniques utilized by
Dayton have much in common with the interwar techniques.
III. THE INTERWAR PLANS: DAYTON'S GHOST
After World War I, despite the radical rearrangement of
European boundaries in line with a principle of nationality,
and despite widescale population shifts in line with those defi-
nitions, it was impossible to eliminate racial, religious and
language minorities. The twenty to twenty-five million people
who remained outside of their nation-state were placed under
the protection of the League of Nations to enable them to "'live
side by side in one and the same State, without succumbing to
the temptation of each trying to force his own nationality on
the other.""6
By design, the League of Nations system for international
protection of minorities was exceptional: it applied to a limited
set of states and a limited set of rights. Furthermore, "tilt
purported not to establish 'a general jurisprudence applicable
wherever racial, linguistic, or religious minorities existed,' but
to facilitate the solution of minority problems in countries
where 'owing to special circumstances, these problems might
present particular difficulties.' 97 The second limitation was
never really an issue: no states argued that minorities should
95. Dayton Accords, supra note 6, Annex 11, art. I(1), 35 I.L.M. 149, 150
[hereinafter Police Task Force Annex].
96. JACOB ROBINSON ET AL., WERE THE MINORITIES TREATIES A FAILURE? 35
(1943) (quoting Prince von Buelow, director of German foreign policy from 1897 to
1909, who believed that it was impossible for people of different nations to live
side by side peacefully).
97. CLAUDE, supra note 2, at 17; see also JULIUS STONE, INTERNATIONAL
GUARANTEES OF MINORITY RIGHTS 14 (1932).
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have more rights."8 However, the second limitation would
plague the League of Nations system, as the states subject to
the provisions-the so-called minorities states-felt unjustly
discriminated against as differential obligations had been im-
posed on them by the Great Powers. The selective nature of
the system eroded its legitimacy and hindered adherence to its
terms.99 In general, the system consisted of three types of
obligations: (1) Multi-partite minorities treaties and the special
chapters of peace treaties dealing with minorities; (2) Decla-
rations made by certain states before the Council of the League
of Nations; 0 and (3) Regional, bipartite agreements, in par-
ticular the German-Polish Convention of May 15, 1922, relat-
ing to Upper Silesia.'"'
The instruments signed by various states took form ac-
cording to the status of the state."2 Defeated states-Austria,
Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey-were bound by minority provi-
sions inserted into the various peace treaties.0 3 New or en-
larged states-Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Rumania
and Greece-concluded special minority treaties with the Prin-
cipal Allies and the Associated Powers (France, Japan, the
United Kingdom and the United States).0 4 States that faced
pressure on minorities rights issues when they applied to
membership with the League-Albania, Lithuania, Latvia,
Estonia, Finland (in respect of the Aland Islands); and
Iraq-made declarations to the Council of the League of Na-
98. However, some minority groups did argue that they should have more
affirmative rights. For a history of the drafting process and explanation of why
stronger minority provisions did not prevail, see generally OSCAR I. JANOWSKY,
THE JEWS AND MINORITY RIGHTS (1898-1919) (1933).
99. This complaint is "completely unjustifiable" according to Pablo de Azcdrate
and to Inis Claude, who argue that the choice was between selective minorities
treaties and no minorities treaties. See PABLO DE AzCARATE, PROTECTION OF NA-
TIONAL MINORITIES 12 (Carnegie Endowment for Intl Peace Occasional Paper No.
5, 1967); see also CLAUDE, supra note 2, at 36.
100. The declarations were addressed to "no other body than the League [of
Nations], as the guarantor of the declared obligations, charged with assuring com-
pliance with the stipulated provisions." ROBINSON ET AL., supra note 96, at 83.
The PCIJ expressed the opinion that the declarations carried the same binding
force as conventional undertakings. See Capotorti, supra note 14, at 18 n.17.
101. Convention Relating to Upper Silesia, supra note 15; see also generally
JULIUS STONE, REGIONAL GUARANTEES OF MINORITY RIGHTS (1933).
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tions"'0 Germany received somewhat special status as a
Great Power (although the reason for the special status was
never formally acknowledged and articulated as such). Germa-
ny signed a bilateral treaty with Poland which created a spe-
cial minority regime for Upper Silesia.'
The instruments purported to safeguard certain rights of
"racial, religious or linguistic minorities," but the framers of
the system made it clear that they regarded this terminology
as synonymous with "national minorities." °7 The obligations
contained in the Minorities Treaties fall into four general cate-
gories: (a) nationality; (b) negative rights; (c) positive
rights;0 3 and (d) specific minority provisions. With the excep-
tion of the latter category, the exact wording of the articles
varied little from treaty to treaty.
A. Nationality provisions
The nationality provisions contained in the minority trea-
ties concluded under the League of Nations system concerned
the acquisition of nationality by persons belonging to minority
groups and the right to opt for the state to which they formerly
belonged. For example, the treaty with the Serb-Croat-Slovene
State declared "to be Serb-Croat-Slovene nationals ipso facto
and without the requirement of any formality, Austrian, Hun-
garian or Bulgarian nationals habitually resident or possessing
rights of citizenship"0 9 or "born in the said territory of par-
105. See id.
106. See Convention Relating to Upper Silesia, supra note 15. Although a num-
ber of additional bi-lateral minority agreements were concluded in the interwar
years, unlike the Upper Silesia agreement, they were external to the League of
Nations minority system. See CLAUDE, supra note 2, at 16.
107. Cf. ROBINSON ET AL., supra note 96, at 40-41.
108. The PCIJ recognized the need for both nondiscrimination provisions (nega-
tive protections) and positive measures. In the Minority Schools in Albania case,
the Court noted:
These two requirements [of negative and positive equality] are
indeed closely interlocked, for there would be no true equality between a
majority and a minority if the latter were deprived of its own institu-
tions, and were consequently compelled to renounce that which consti-
tutes the very essence of its being as a minority.
Advisory Opinion, Minority Schools in Albania, 1935 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 62, at
17.
109. Treaty Between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers (the British
Empire, France, Italy, Japan and the United States), and the Serb-Croat-Slovene
State, Sept. 10, 1919, art. 3, 226 Consol. T.S. 182, 185 [hereinafter Serb-Croat-
814 [Vol. XXHI:3
19981 PROSPECTS FOR NATIONAL MINORITIES
ents habitually resident or possessing rights of citizenship.""0
The treaty went on to state that "[nevertheless, the persons
referred to above who are over eighteen years of age will be
entitled under the conditions contained in the said treaties to
opt for any other nationality which may be open to them.""'
B. Negative Rights
Individuals belonging to minority groups were granted
nondiscrimination and negative equality rights under the
League of Nations system, irrespective of their minority status.
The treaties demanded, with only minor variations: (1) right to
life and liberty---"full and complete protection of life and liber-
ty" irrespective of "birth, nationality, language, race or reli-
gion;""2 (2) "free exercise, whether public or private, of any
creed, religion or belief, whose practices are not inconsistent
with public order or public morals;""' (3) equality before the
law and enjoyment of the same civil and political rights "with-
out distinction as to race, language or religion;"" and (4) no
interference with the "enjoyment of civil and political rights, as
for instance admission to public employments, functions and
honours, or the exercise of professions and industries" because
of "[d]ifference of religion, creed or confession."" 5
C. Positive rights
The League of Nations treaties also included provisions
which promoted "positive equality;" that is, provisions for the
equality of minorities to "preserve and develop their national
culture and consciousness."" 6 These measures allowed minor-
ities: (1) the use of their own language in private relations;" 7
Slovene Minority Treaty].
110. Id. art. 4, 226 Consol. T.S. at 186.
111. Id. art. 3, 226 Consol. T.S. at 185. The treaty further provided: "Option by
a husband will cover his wife and option by parents will cover their children un-
der eighteen years of age," and that "[aill persons born in the territory of the
Serb-Croat-Slovene State who are not born nationals of another State shall ipso
facto become Serb-Croat-Slovene nationals." Id. arts. 3, 6, 226 Consol. T.S. at 185-
86.
112. Id. art. 2, 226 Consol. T.S. at 185.
113. Id.
114. Id. art. 7, 226 Consol. T.S. at 186.
115. Id.
116. AZCARATE, supra note 14, at 82.
117. See Serb-Croat-Slovene Minority Treaty, supra note 109, art. 7, 226
815
BROOK. J. INTL L. [Vol. XXIII:3
(2) the use of their own language before the Courts;' (3)
adequate facilities for a public education in primary schools in
their own language, whenever there was a "considerable pro-
portion" of minority students;". (4) the establishment of reli-
gious and welfare institutions, schools and other educational
facilities under their-own control and with their own lan-
guage; 2 (5) the right to an equitable proportion of state and
communal expenditures for educational, religious and welfare
purposes.' 2'
D. Specific Minorities Provisions
For the most part, the provisions applied equally to mem-
bers of all minority groups within the jurisdiction of a particu-
lar treaty. However, Muslims received special protections in
the treaties with Greece and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and
Slovenes. 122 This was done over the objection of leaders of the
Muslim community who argued that they should be considered
a majority people, not a minority.'2 Similarly, special provi-
sions for Jews were included in the treaties with Greece, Po-
Consol. T.S. at 186.
118. See id.
119. See id. art. 9, 226 Consol. T.S. at 187. The full text of the first paragraph
of the article reads:
The Serb-Croat-Slovene Government will provide in the public educational
system in towns and districts in which a considerable proportion of Serb-
Croat-Slovene nationals of other speech than that of the official language
are resident adequate facilities for ensuring that in the primary schools
the instruction shall be given to the children of such Serb-Croat-Slovene
nationals through the medium of their own language. This provision shall
not prevent the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government from making the teaching
of the official language obligatory in said schools.
Id.
120. See Minorities Treaty Between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers
(the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, and the United States) and Poland,
June 13, 1919, art. 8, 225 Consol. T.S. 412, 417 (giving minorities "an equal right
to establish, manage and control at their own expense . . . religious and social in-
stitutions.").
121. See id. arts. 9, 10, 225 Consol. T.S. at 418.
122. The Serb-Croat-Slovene State agreed "to grant the Musulmans in the mat-
ter of family law and personal status provisions suitable for regulating these mat-
ters in accordance with Musulman usage . ... to ensure protection for the
mosques, cemeteries and other Musulman religious establishments," and to grant
full recognition to "Musulman pious foundations (Wakfs) and religious and chari-
table establishments." Serb-Croat-Slovene Minority Treaty, supra note 109, art. 10,
226 Consol. T.S. at 186-87.
123. Cf JELAVICH, supra note 3, at 151.
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land and Romania, as well as in the Lithuania declaration."
Stipulations for the Magyar and Saxon communities in
Transylvania were included in the treaty with Romania;
Czechoslovakia provided for an autonomous territory for
Ruthenians; and Greece accepted special obligations for the
Vlachs of the Pindus region and for the non-Greek communi-
ties of Mount Athos."
As worded, the minorities clauses can be read in a wholly
individualistic way, to protect the rights of individual members
of minorities instead of minority groups as collective Enti-
ties.2  The drafters deliberately avoided terminology that
would have clearly given minorities status as corporate units
(except for the purpose of allocation of an equitable share of
public funds for schools and the like).27 To recognize minor-
ities per se, the drafters feared, would be to recognize "states
within states," a concept at odds with then prevalent absolute
notions of state sovereignty.2 Thus, even the positive rights
were individually framed, as arising out of membership in a
minority and facilitating the maintenance and development of
group life.'29 Nevertheless, the individual nature of the Mi-
norities Treaties should not be overstated. The rights protected
by the League of Nations were, in part, rights accorded for the
exercise and benefit of minority groups.' Minorities clauses
124. See C.A. MACARTNEY, NATIONAL STATEfS AND NATIONAL MINORITIES 230-52
(1934).
125. See id. at 243-48; see also Capotorti, supra note 14, para. 99(g), at 19.
126. See CLAUDE, supra note 2, at 19-20; ROBINSON ET AL., supra note 96, at
71.
127. See 5 A HISTORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE OF PARIS, supra note 1, at
137.
128. See id. For present, alternative visions of state sovereignty, see generally
ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE
WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995); HURST HANNUM, AUTONO-
MY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION (1990); Juirgen Habermas, The Europe-
an State. Its Achievements and Its Limitations. On the Past and Future of Sover-
eignty and Citizenship, 9 RATIO JURIS 125 (1996); Anne F. Bayefsky, Cultural
Sovereignty, Relativism, and International Human Rights: New Excuses for Old
Strategies, 9 RATIO JURIS 42 (1996); Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State "Sov-
ereignty", 25 GA. J. INTIL & COMP. L. 31 (1995-1996); Richard B. Bilder, Perspec-
tives on Sovereignty in the Current Context: An American Viewpoint, 20 CASE W.
RES. CAN. U.S. L.J. 9 (1994); W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights
in Contemporary International Law, 84 AM. J. INTL L. 866 (1990).
129. See EDWARD CHASzAR, THE INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM OF NATIONAL MINORI-
TIES 3 (1988).
130. Cf. ANDRE MANDELSTAm, LA PROTECTION DES MINORITIES 53-70 (1925).
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at times included references to the agency of minority commu-
nities and stipulations concerning proportional representation
and political and cultural autonomy, all group-based rights."3 '
Three interrelated elements differentiate the minorities
clauses from the previous systems: who established and who
guaranteed the provisions; the methods by which it was to
maintain peace and protect the rights of national minorities;
and the assumptions upon which it rested.
For the first time, enforcement was not left merely to the
signatories or to the prerogative of an interested state, usually
a "kin-state." Instead of this ad-hoc and often opportunistic
oversight, an independent, neutral body (the League of Na-
tions) gave its guarantee to the agreements.'32 This new
method of supervision was intended to give a "more disinter-
ested character to the performance of international obligations
toward minorities."' Unlike the systems of old, disputes
were to be settled by an independent judicial institution, the
Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), instead of by
the state that had the most political power (or the highest
degree of self-interest).'34 Neutrals played a special role in
other aspects of minority protections. The plan for Upper
Silesia, for example, envisioned special guarantees for minori-
ties on both sides of the new frontier-the establishment of a
Mixed Commission to which these minorities could address
complaints (presided over by neutrals) and an Arbitral Tribu-
nal (also presided over by neutrals).'35
Minorities rights schemes of the interwar years were revo-
lutionary in admitting the right of individual minorities-who
131. A discussion of the nature of group rights is beyond the scope of this
Article. For a more extensive discussion of this topic, see generally GROUP RIGHTS
(Judith Baker ed., 1994); NATAN LERNER, GROUP RIGHTS AND DISCRIMINATION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1991).
132. For example, disputes arising under the minority treaty of the Serb-Croat-
Slovene State would not be subject to the signatory states, but would rather be
brought before the Court of the League of Nations. See STONE, supra note 97, at
247; CLAUDE, supra note 2, at 20-21; ROBINSON ET AL., supra note 96, at 23.
133. ROBINSON ET AL., supra note 96, at 40. Nevertheless, the system could not
become politically sanitized. As Robinson notes: "even the new system could not
completely eliminate dissatisfaction on the part of those governments which were
bound by minority obligations. Moreover, the collective will still had to find ex-
pression through the medium of individual powers. It was impossible to completely
eradicate the political aspect from public law." Id.
134. See Capotorti, supra note 14, paras. 123, 128, at 24-25.
135. See KAECKENBEECK, supra note 15, at 10.
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were not then recognized as subjects of international law-to
appeal directly to an international body. On the one hand,
access to the guarantee was restricted. Specifically, standing to
bring breaches of any of the treaties to the attention of the
League of Nations Council was limited to Member states and,
as such, only member states had the right to bring appeals
before the PCIJ. 1" Yet significantly, although individual com-
plaints were not provided for in the treaties, through a series
of interpretive documents minorities, other states and Entities
gained the right to petition for redress of discrimination." 7
The assumptions on which the system was grounded dem-
onstrated a dramatic change in the use of international policy
proposals. In contrast with earlier times, collective security,
instead of an ad hoc system of opposing alliances, was viewed
as essential for maintenance of peace. 8' The system also
rested on the belief that people of different nationalities could
live in peace, side by side, in the same state. To this end, polit-
ical democracy and economic liberalism were values to be pro-
moted. Moreover, the system saw a need for both external and
internal guarantees for national minorities. As Inis L. Claude
explains:
The operation of the treaties and declarations depended
heavily upon the compliance of the minority states with the
obligation to treat the stipulations as fundamental laws and
to implement them by internal legislation. However, it was
deemed essential to supplement internal provisions by an
external guarantee, based on the premise that the treatment
of minorities in the treaty-bound states was a problem of
international concern." 9
By implicitly and explicitly providing for both external and
internal guarantees, the interwar plans posed a challenge to
the traditional notion of sovereignty. In fact, it has been ob-
136. See Jose Felix Merladet, International Protection of Minorities: Past, Pres-
ent, and Some Prospects for the Future (1981) (unpublished paper, Harvard Law
School) (on file with Harvard Law School Library).
137. The 1929 report of the Council of the League which specifies its operating
procedures (known as the "Adatci Report") is reproduced in full in an appendix to
AZCARATE, supra note 14, at 161-209.
138. For historical background, see generally J.A.S. GRENVILLE, THE MAJOR
INTERNATIONAL TREATIES 1914-1945: A HISTORY AND GUIDE WITH TEXTS (1987).
139. CLAUDE, supra note 2, at 20 (endnote omitted).
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served that "[t]he intervention of an external agency in the
relationship between a state and its own nationals was clearly
incompatible with the concept of absolute sovereignty."140 The
interwar plans demanded the invalidity of this absolute con-
cept of sovereignty as a prerequisite to their very existence. As
one commentator has observed:
In the Versailles peace system, the minorities provisions
constituted a corollary and corrective to the principle of na-
tional self-determination. They became possible only through
the restriction of absolute state sovereignty. Insofar as the
disturbance of external peace was caused by internal discord,
the minorities provisions, as a means of regulating the rela-
tions between national groups were a part of the general
peace structure. 4'
Despite these innovations, the Minorities Treaties were
not enough to protect the rights of minorities and preserve
peace. The explanation may lie in the lack of political will on
the part of the international community to stand behind the
League of Nations and enforce the provisions and the lack of
the will of the Minorities States to stand by their agreements.
However, weakness in the system itself encouraged and exac-
erbated the lack of political will. The system was crippled at
the outset by the impression that it was of a temporary nature.
Enforcement mechanisms were weak; as a matter of fact, trea-
ties were not enforceable in domestic courts and no effective
rules of enforcement were established by the Council of the
League of Nations. At the same time, Minorities States fre-
quently did everything within their power to block enforce-
ment 42 and forestall petitions by imposing obstacles to intim-
140. Id. at 21. Indeed, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, Romania and Poland
fought against the Minorities Treaties largely on these grounds. In the words of
one author: "They characterized the minorities clauses as a violation of the princi-
ple of equality of states, an attack upon their sovereignty, and an indication of a
lack of confidence and good faith .... They claimed that an international guaran-
tee was a source of potential danger, because the minorities would feel that their
status rested upon the support of foreign powers." ROBINSON ET AL., supra note
96, at 154-55. Pashich, the head of the Serb-Croat-Slovene delegation, also protest-
ed against the application of the treaties to the entire territory of the former king-
dom-that is, to Serbia and Montenegro as well as the newly acquired territo-
ries-arguing that such application violated his state's right to sovereignty. Id. at
155.
141. ROBINSON ET AL., supra note 96, at 41.
142. States could enact provisions that would undermine the intention of the
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idate and discourage complainants. While individual minorities
filed few complaints, kin-states which were members of the
Council of the League of Nations tended to take the initiative
in implementing league guarantees-for their own benefit. The
wording of the Treaties was vague and schematic, failing to
account for differences among minority groups such as differ-
ing needs and claim to education and autonomous institutions
and failing to settle major explosive issues such as language
rights. Finally, as underscored repeatedly, the minorities provi-
sions applied only to a select number of states. Ultimately, the
interwar agreements failed to reach their goals.
IV. LOOKING FORWARD: FOREBODING AND HOPE
Dayton displays a persistent faith in some of the underly-
ing assumptions and practices of the interwar international
legal policy proposals. At the same time, it shows a pragmatic
shift in international law to address today's national conflicts
in the context of postwar regional and international human
rights systems and mechanisms. This section sketches the
similarities and differences between Dayton and its predeces-
sor. Ultimately, it asks whether the differences between Day-
ton and the interwar agreements could indeed provide salva-
tion.
A. Foreboding: Similarities With Interwar Schemes
The schemes designed to protect minority rights in the
interwar period, evinced a "paradoxical 'alliance' between tur-
bulent nationalist passion and a newly autonomous interna-
tional law.""' Today's international law, grounded in a host
of post-World War II agreements and practices, no longer can
be said to be newly autonomous. The place of law in the re-
gional and international spheres has taken hold. Human rights
can now be said to be "universal, indivisible and interdepen-
dent and interrelated"-the words of the Vienna Declaration
from the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights.' Re-
treaties. For example, although minority groups were allowed schools in their own
language, a state could deprive private schools of the right to issue diplomas. Also,
economic measures that would have a particular impact on a national minority
could be enacted as long as the provisions did not single out the minority.
143. Berman, supra note 20, at 1798.
144. WORLD CONFERENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THE VIENNA DECLARATION AND
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gional and international systems and mechanisms designed to
protect human rights are now in place, although often neglect-
ed and inoperable. Yet still, with its own paradoxical alliance
with nationalism, the Dayton Accords have much in common
with the minority protections spawned by the Treaty of Ver-
sailles.'45 Some of these commonalties are beneficial for mi-
norities; many are foreboding.
First, the Dayton Accords, like the minority rights
protections of the interwar period, approach nationalism with a
"mixture of desire and terror."'46 The carving up of the newly
recognized state of Bosnia and Herzegovina along national
lines re-enshrined the existence and power of the nation-the
imaginary communities defined in opposition to the "other" by
real and imagined differences in history, culture, language and
tradition. The national purification of Croatia and the estab-
lishment of a "blood" principle for Croatian voters (whereby
"Croats" living anywhere could vote in Croatian elections),
further re-cemented Balkan nationalism as a defining social,
political and legal principle. Granted, Dayton did not create
the nationalisms, nor the battlelines. Dayton only recognized
the facts on the ground that no one had the will to reverse.
Nevertheless, in doing so, dreaded nationalism was not only
tolerated by the Dayton Accords, but once again in European
history, the nation became part of the "solution" for peace.
Second, international diplomacy in the former Yugoslavia
may have begun with a call for human rights, but it culminat-
ed in the same legal pragmatism of the interwar period. The
normative conception of the sovereign state and the duly elect-
ed leaders of that sovereign was replaced with a functional
definition: those with power to act as the state were the state.
Whether and how the powerful gained their power became less
and less relevant. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard
Holbrook's principle of diplomacy was simple: negotiate with
those who have power over people at any given time-stop war
at all cost. At one time, this strategy brought accused Bosnian
Serb war criminals Karadzic and Mladic to the bargaining ta-
ble.47 Ultimately, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic (who
PROGRAMIE OF ACTION 30 (June 1993).
145. Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany,
June 28, 1919, 225 Consol. T.S. 188.
146. Berman, supra note 20, at 1805.
147. See Serb General Rejects Bosnia Pact: Argues That Accord Will Put his
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himself has been named by human rights groups as a war
criminal with command authority over documented war
crimes) became the negotiator for Bosnian and Croatian
Serbs. 48 These populations never elected Milosevic as their
leader and do not in fact "follow" Milosevic, particularly after
he failed to come to their rescue in the summer of 1995 when
Serb-controlled Krajina collapsed to Croatian troops. 49
Croatian President Franjo Tudjman became the negotiator for
Bosnian Croats, a group over which he has no formal power in
positivist statist terms.
Holbrook cannot be blamed for a strategy that could mere-
ly reflect political and military realities. In fact, Holbrook's
negotiations only became potent when power shifted, in partic-
ular when Croatia destroyed the Krajina Serbs and threatened
to drive the Bosnian Serbs out of Banja Luka and when, after
Srebrenica, NATO finally joined the fight. That negotiations
divided the players by artificial nationalist groupings was of
little concern to Holbrook and his team. That the success of the
agreement depended on Milosevic gaining and retaining power
over Bosnian Serbs and Tudjman doing the same for Bosnian
Croats could not stand in the way of "peace now." The Dayton
Accords, like the interwar agreements, require the perpetua-
tion and domination of nationalist leaders.
Third, many of the fundamental assumptions underlying
both Dayton and the interwar years were the same. Both saw
a need for collective security, the promotion of political democ-
racy and economic liberalism and external and internal guar-
antees for minority rights. As in the interwar years, under
Dayton, external bodies are assumed to have the right to inter-
fere in the relationship between a state and its own nationals.
More troubling for national minorities, just as in the inter-
war years, in the former Yugoslavia "the problem of national-
ism came to be perceived as a primal 'clamoring' to which one
should respond with a sophisticated and heterogeneously com-
People Under 'Butchers', CHI. TRIB., Dec. 3, 1995, available in 1995 WL 13107451.
148. See id.; Robin Knight, Can There Be Justice as Well as Peace in Bosnia?
War Crimes, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 4, 1995, at 30.
149. Serb refugees from Krajina and from parts of Serb-controlled Bosnia which
fell at that time complained of being "sold" by Milosevic. Interviews with unnamed
refugees, in Sremska, Mitrovica, Novi Sad and Belgrade (July-Aug. 1995).
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posed 'Plan.'"'5 0 "These people have been killing each other
for so long, I don't know what we can do," one Dutch UN
Peacekeeper said after the United Nations Protection Force
(UNPROFOR) flight to Mostar was canceled due to renewed
fighting.5 Far from a primal clamoring, however, national-
ism in the former Yugoslavia spread as the direct result of a
deliberate political plan crafted by political and academic elites
at the top.'52 Nationalisms, supported by myth and history,
are firmly rooted in the culture of the Balkans. Economic crisis
and political and social insecurity laid the foundations for
chauvinist ideologies in then-Yugoslavia. Yet the emergence of
nationalist ideologies was far from inevitable. In a calculated
series of maneuvers, political and academic elites tapped na-
tionalist undercurrents, squelching alternative voices and pit-
ting national groups against each other.
Misinformed about the nature of the problem,
UNPROFOR's Plan for managing and disarming nationalism
failed. Similarly misdirected, the Dayton Accords do nothing to
shake the power of those responsible at the top, but instead
further entrenches their power. Today, Serbian President
Slobodan Milosevic and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman
continue to direct-or at least condone-human rights viola-
tions with impunity, including the harassment and mistreat-
ment of national minorities (and in Serbia, Albanians in partic-
ular), foreigners, opposition journalists and political opponents.
Moreover, the foreign media continue to read the conflict as
primal, overlooking the hand of political elites in shaking the
nationalist tree.
Fourth, both in the interwar years and under Dayton,
relationships with neighboring kin-states and further bilateral
treaties are permitted and even anticipated. In the interwar
years, bilateral treaties, although initially bolstering the mi-
norities agreements, eventually led to their demise. It has been
observed that "[a]s a rule, these treaties were for the benefit of
a minority whose kinsmen constituted the ruling majority of
the neighboring state. In other words, the signatories were
reciprocally interested in the establishment of a regime of law
for their kinsmen."153 Dayton allows each constituent Entity
150. Berman, supra note 20, at 1800.
151. Interview with unnamed UNPROFOR Officer, in Zagreb (June 1995).
152. See, e.g., SILBER & LITLE, supra note 25, at 29-35.
153. ROBINSON ET AL., supra note 96, at 56. Not all of the treaties with neigh-
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of Bosnia and Herzegovina to make its own treaties with
neighboring "kin" states. There is every reason to believe that,
unless preventive steps are taken, the same problem with
bilateral agreements will reoccur in the Balkans. In the
interwar years, some of the bipartite agreements provided
their own machinery to settle conflicts which ultimately under-
cut the League's attempts at enforcement. There is little in
Dayton to prevent the "kin" states in the Balkans from doing
the same.
Fifth, the Dayton Accords contain many of the specific
attributes of the interwar plans. In resolving thorny questions
for members of minority groups, Dayton harks from the "prod-
ucts" of Versailles, in particular the plans designed to resolve
the disputes over the Saar, Danzig, Upper Silesia (as well as
the 1947 plan for Palestine)." Plans old and new include(d):
Minority guarantees: Dayton includes the same kinds
of rights as those seen in the interwar years: national-
ity provisions, nondiscrimination provisions, negative
rights and even some positive rights. Significantly, it
invokes the extensive protections of the Framework
Convention.' As in the interwar years, nearly all of
these guarantees are individualistic, not collective, but
still within these guarantees national minorities can
find protections.
" Provisions for emigration and restitution of property:
Just as in the interwar years, provision has been
made for the return of the displaced and for limited
restitution of property.'56
bors during the interwar years were contrary to the general aims of the Minorities
Treaties. See id. A number of them, however, did repudiate the very purpose of
the Minorities Treaties. One of most egregious such cases, the bilateral agreement
between Greece and Turkey concluded on January 30, 1923, provided for the com-
pulsory exchange of Greek and Turkish populations. See id. at 57.
154. See Resolution Adopted on the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the
Palestinian Question, G.A. Res. 181(M), U.N. GAOR, 2d Sess., at 130, 132, U.N.
Doc. A/519 (1947).
155. See, e.g., Human Rights Annex, supra note 72, app. (Human Rights
Agreements); see also generally Framework Convention, supra note 92.
156. See BOSN. & HERZ. CONST. art. 11(5).
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* Elements for self-determination: As in the interwar
years, Dayton provides for two types of self-determina-
tion: both objective-unifying people by national
groups (regardless of whether they identify with the
group and elect the division)-and subjec-
tive-providing for control of the political will of the
people.
157
* Limited supranational integration: As explained
above, Dayton creates a "thin roof to hold together
the two constituent Entities of the Republic of Bosnia
Herzegovina, that is Republika Srpska and the Feder-
ation of Bosnia and Herzegovina." 8 The roof in-
cludes: a joint presidency,'59 a parliamentary assem-
bly,60 Constitutional Court 6' and institutions per-
taining to arbitration, 2 human rights,'63 refugees
and displaced persons,"6 preservation of national
monuments 65 and public corporations.'66
* Internationalization, regionalization and international
and regional supervision: The parties to Dayton agree
to both a short term international military pres-
ence 67 and an international police task force.'68 In
addition, in striking resemblance to the interwar
plans (particularly Upper Silesia), neutral regional
and international organizations and individuals play a
critical role in the structure and operations of the new
federal government, particularly with respect to the
157. See generally Dayton Accords, supra note 6, Annex 3, 35 I.L.M. 114-17
(providing a framework for the holding of elections, supervised by the OSCE).
158. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
159. See BOSN. & HERZ. CONST. art. V.
160. See id. art. IV.
161. See id. art. VI.
162. See Dayton Accords, supra note 6, Annex 5, 35 I.L.M. 129 (providing for a
system of arbitration to settle disputes between the Entities).
163. See generally Human Rights Annex, supra note 72, 35 I.L.M. 130-36.
164. See generally Refugees Annex, supra note 51, 35 I.L.M. 136-41.
165. See generally National Monument Annex, supra note 77, 35 I.L.M. 141-44.
166. See generally Dayton Accords, supra note 6, Annex 9, 35 I.L.M. 14446
(establishing public corporations to operate various public facilities).
167. See generally Dayton Accords, supra note 6, Annex 1A, 35 I.L.M. 91-101
(dealing with military aspects of the peace settlement).
168. See generally Police Task Force Annex, supra note 95, 35 I.L.M. 149-52.
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rights of minorities and related issues.
Finally, the Dayton Accords, like the treaties of the
interwar period, are limited in scope, albeit in a much different
manner. By adopting the language of universal human rights,
Dayton does not suffer limitations identical to those of the
interwar guarantees, which applied more selective rights on a
state by state basis. Still, Dayton, like the interwar guaran-
tees, has force in only limited geographic areas. Because the
purpose of Dayton was limited to ending the wars in Bosnia
and Herzegovina and Croatia, the agreement does not mention
other troubled lands in the former Yugoslavia, including the
ethnic-Albanian land of Kosovo.'69 Contrary to their practice
of negotiating with all leaders with power-regardless of
whether they are duly elected leaders of recognized states-the
Dayton negotiating team did not deal with Ibrahim Rugova,
the leader of Kosovo Albanians, the fourth largest national
group in the former Yugoslavia.
Kosovo, like Macedonia, was seen as simply irrelevant to
Dayton's limited goal of immediate cessation of hostilities. Yet
Kosovo played a central role in the destruction of Yugoslavia
and it continues to play a major role in destabilization of the
region. Milosevic rekindled Serbian nationalism through
Kosovo and the issue propelled him into power. Without
Kosovo, Milosevic would not have had the power base he need-
ed to plunge into Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. Already
a good Communist, Milosevic's deeds on Kosovo showed he was
a good nationalist as well. Milosevic's strategy on Kosovo be-
came a defining and delimiting moment for Serbian politics.
Once Milosevic had become the protector of Serbs in Kosovo,
his role spread as the protector of Serbs everywhere. Without
the Kosovo card, Milosevic would have had a far more difficult
time implementing this strategy. The end of the war in Bosnia
and Herzegovina and Croatia did not completely disarm this
169. Kosovo is the Serbian term for this region which was an autonomous
province under Tito's regime and until 1989, when Milosevic declared that
henceforth it would be part of Serbia, subservient to Belgrade in all respects.
Kosovo is the Albanian term for the self-proclaimed independent Albanian state of
Kosovo, which Albanians created after Milosevic stripped Kosovo of its autonomy.
The status of Kosovo today is disputed. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, OPEN
WOUNDS: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN Kosovo xi-xii (1994).
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strategy; Serbs still see themselves as the victims, and the first
perpetrator is the Kosovar Albanian. As in the interwar period,
the Dayton Accords may have put out the fire but, in the
words of human rights activist Guzmund Pula, "next to the
coals a combustible explosion awaits."70
B. Hope?: Shifts in International Law and Diplomacy
The agreements of Dayton and of the interwar period both
reflect complex, paradoxical shifts in international law and di-
plomacy. The interwar lawyers bypassed "the dichotomy be-
tween statist positivism and liberal nationalism in favor of a
simultaneous affirmation of the autonomy of international law
and an openness to the vital forces of nationalism." 7' This
meant reshaping nationalism by "endowing it with legal
form."'72 At the same time, "the constraints of the stable legal
order grounded in sovereignty were rejected in favor of an
autonomous, 'experimental' exploration of specifically legal
international techniques, doctrines and institutions." The
nationalisms of the countries of the former Yugoslavia are as
vital as ever, but they are-similarly endowed with legal form
and checked by regional and international doctrines and insti-
tutions. The main difference is that the global legal environ-
ment and system of checks have changed, shifting even farther
away from states to regional and international systems and
mechanisms. While this shift may be cause for alarm, as states
may be presupposed as necessary enforcers of rights,' 74 it
may also provide an opening in which we can locate hope.
In operation, Dayton simultaneously sanctions and re-
stricts liberal nationalism and statist positivism. In supporting
the statist paradigm, 75 Dayton trumpets the legal fiction of
170. Interview with Guzmund Pula, in Kosovo (Oct. 1994).
171. Berman, supra note 20, at 1803.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1805 (footnote omitted).
174. For this observation, I am indebted to Yash Ghai. He has elaborated his
ideas in Yash Ghai, Globalization and the Politics of Rights (1996) (unpublished
paper, on file with author). See also generally Charles Tilly, Globalization Threat-
ens Labor's Rights, 47 INT'L LABOR & WORKING-CLASS HISTORY 1 (1995) (arguing
that weak states have less ability to enforce labor rights).
175. Attention should be paid to the interests of the negotiating countries, and
in particular the United States, in the perpetuation of the statist paradigm in
Bosnia and Herzegovina. This important analysis is left to a later date.
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an independent, functioning state of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
It creates the entities that had been won through battle and
takes steps to encourage the development of civil society within
that structure. In doing so, Dayton bows to the statist thinking
that is a core tenant of many of the leaders of Croats, Serbs,
Muslims and Albanians of the former Yugoslavia. According to
these leaders, every nation must have a state and that state
must include all members of the nation, although the collective
identity may indeed transcend state boundaries. To a varying
degree, leaders of each nation have been unable and/or unwill-
ing to develop a civil society which would offer alternative
means for citizen participation and promote tolerance of differ-
ent interests. Seeking to bolster liberal democracy within the
statist paradigm, Dayton attempts to take up the slack by
suggesting groundwork for civil society. Dayton alone cannot
mandate the civil society or even all of the institutions and
attitudes that will support civil society. Nevertheless, by creat-
ing a space for peace and for the existence of something (law?)
beyond brute power, Dayton may also open the space for the
development of civil society within the weak federal state.
While publicly praising the liberal state, Dayton's reality
on the ground creates a much different impression. Political
and military realities encourage ill-liberal practices and porous
state boundaries. For example, the agreement set up a complex
system for elections, but those who implemented the agree-
ment had neither the power nor the will to enforce its own
protections 76 and thus they denied the people of Bosnia and
Herzegovina the chance to elect their own fate-by the time
voters reached their polling place their choices were eliminat-
ed, their future determined. National lines had been drawn
and people had been told where they fell. In many respects,
the boundaries of the resulting entities are porous. Each com-
ponent Entity can create strong alliances, including military
agreements, with its neighbors. Indeed, they have already
176. For example, that the OSCE would find conditions in Bosnia suitable for
elections was a fait accompli. That conditions for fair and democratic elections did
not exist could not stand in the way of the United States deadline. Although the
implementers of Dayton have made efforts to secure refugees' rights to return
home to vote, they do not have enough power to compel respect for that right. See
UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, THE STATE OF THE WoRLD'S
REFUGEES 170 (1997).
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begun to do so. Moreover, the international community is invit-
ed to make decisions and take actions normally within the
sovereignty of a state, from international policing to choosing
members of the Constitutional Court.'77 The intrusion of neu-
trals further corrodes the statist paradigm.
In moving away from the state, Dayton is influenced most
by the environment in which it finds itself: a world marked by
rapid globalization in markets, information and security ar-
rangements. "The past role of the nation-state," Lung-chu
Chen writes, "cannot be taken for granted without a critical
reappraisal in light of the changing demands, expectations and
conditions of the present."78 These developments chip away
at nation-state boundaries. According to Richard Falk, "the
essence of the new order is the globalization of capital and the
power of market forces, bypassing even the strongest states.
States are now unable really to control interest rates or the
value of their own currencies, the most elemental aspects of
traditional notions of territorial sovereignty."'79 Residents of
Europe, especially in areas of conflict, look to regional and in-
ternational law and institutions for protection, jobs and
goods.' 0 Their leaders look to international bodies for mar-
kets, military support and other assistance.'8'
Where the interwar period saw a shift in international law
from states to nations (and to individuals as well), Dayton
demonstrates a "double shift." Global power and the reach of
international law has shifted simultaneously out to interna-
tional and regional actors (i.e., international financial actors
such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank;182
international and regional security arrangements;' and in-
177. See BOSN. & HERZ. CONST. art. V.
178. LUNG-cHU CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL
LAW 26 (1989).
179. Richard Falk, Remarks at the 87th Annual Meeting of the American Soci-
ety of International Law (Apr. 2, 1993), in AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 87TH ANNUAL MEETING 398 (1993).
180. Cf Jost Delbriick, Global Migration-Immigration-Multiethnicity: Chal-
lenges to the Concept of the "Nation-State", 2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 45, 48-
57 (1994).
181. For a book on this issue popular in certain business circles, see KENICHI
OHMAE, THE END OF THE NATION STATE (1995).
182. See generally Lan Cao, Towards a New Sensibility for International Eco-
nomic Development, 32 TEX. INT'L L.J. 209 (1997).
183. See generally LEGAL ASPECTS OF A NEW EUROPEAN INFRASTRUCTURE (Arie
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ternational and regional arrangements to protect human
rights,' in particular, the rights of racial, national, religious,
linguistic and other minorities)'85 and down to "transnational
social forces." Transnational social forces, from environmental
and human rights non-governmental organizations'86 to com-
munal groups that spread over nation-state lines, are "gradual-
ly shaping a very weak but still real global civil society that
represents a form of globalization from below, as an alternative
to the globalization from above being achieved by market forc-
es." 87 Leaders of nation-states today have lost power as they
must answer to both of these levels if they are to survive. At
the same time, with the decline of the nation-state, responsibil-
ity for rights enforcement has shifted increasingly from the
state to regional and international entities. Both today's prob-
lems and tomorrow's solutions must go beyond state sovereign-
ty.
Dayton, in the course of reflecting the reality on the
ground, was structured along these lines. While the state hap-
pens to be legitimized in the process, ironically it is the state
that will likely lose power in the end. The Dayton Accords
reflect the understanding that in today's Europe nation-state
boundaries have become more fluid and less relevant for the
purpose of fashioning guarantees for regional and international
security and minority rights. International community elites
create regional and international law and policy on treatment
of minority groups; international treaties and customary law
Bloed & Wilco de Jonge eds., 1992); Max Jacobson, Collective Security in Europe
Today, 18 WASH. Q. 59 (1995).
184. The OSCE is a good case in point. For a concise summary of issues in
this regard, see generally Arie Bloed, Monitoring the CSCE Human Dimension: In
Search of Its Effectiveness, in MONITORING HUMAN RIGHTs IN EUROPE 45 (Arie
Bloed et al. eds., 1993).
185. See, e.g., Claire Palley, Possible Ways and Means to Facilitate the Peaceful
and Constructive Resolution of Situations Involving Racial, National, Religious and
Linguistic Minorities, U.N. Doc. EICN.4ISub.2/1989/43 (1989).
186. See, e.g., A. Dan Tarlock, The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in
the Development of International Environmental Law, 68 CHJ.-KENT L. REV. 61
(1992); Peter J. Spiro, New Global Communities: Nongovernmental Organizations in
International Decision-Making Institutions, 18 WASH. Q. 45 (1995).
187. Falk, supra note 179, at 399. For a different definition of "transovereignty"
that requires a certain fundamental commitment to an organization's values, see
generally Timothy P. Terrell & Bernard L. McNamee, Transovereignty: Separating
Human Rights From Traditional Sovereignty and the Implications for the Ethics of
International Law Practice, 17 FORDHAMi INT'L L.J. 459 (1994).
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on human rights can serve to set their boundaries. This pro-
cess in turn influences the identity of national groups and the
range of acceptable solutions to their problems.
Solutions to the conflict in the Balkans and elsewhere can
only come from within this new global context. If Dayton is
conceived as a static document, there is little hope for peace
and justice in the Balkans. However, if Dayton is perceived as
a peace process, adjustments can be made in the implementa-
tion phase of the plan to correct for missteps. This brief analy-
sis of Dayton's response to the national question and compari-
son with the interwar minorities plans exposes some of the
plan's weaknesses and suggests some steps for reform. Ulti-
mately, as in the interwar period, enforcement will depend not
only on legal technique but also on political will. Given the
shifts in the global landscape, it will be actors above and below
the state who are called upon to take action. It is unclear
whether they are up to the task.
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